Automated analysis of some security mechanism of SCEP by Martinelli, Fabio et al.
 C
 
Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Automated analysis of some security 
mechanism of SCEP 
 
 
F. Martinelli, M. Petrocchi, A. Vaccarelli 
 
 
 
 
 
IIT TR-12/2002 
 
Technical report 
 
 
 
 
Giugno  2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Iit 
 
Istituto di Informatica e Telematica  
Automated Analysis of Some Security Mechanisms of
SCEP
Fabio Martinelli, Marinella Petrocchi, and Anna Vaccarelli
Istituto per le Applicazioni Telematiche C.N.R.
Via G.Moruzzi 1 - Pisa, Italy.
Fabio.Martinelli, Marinella.Petrocchi,
Anna.Vaccarelli@iat.cnr.it
Abstract. In this paper we analyze SCEP, the Simple Certificate Enrollment Pro-
cedure, a two-way communication protocol to manage the secure emission of dig-
ital certificates to network devices. The protocol provides a consistent method of
requesting and receiving certificates from different Certification Authorities, by
offering an open and scalable solution for deploying certificates. It can be bene-
ficial to all network devices and IPSEC software solutions. We formally analyze
SCEP through a software tool for the automatic analysis of cryptographic proto-
cols, able to discover, at a conceptual level, attacks against security procedures.
Our method of survey contributes towards a better understanding of the structure
and the aims of a protocol, both for protocol developers, analyzers and final users.
1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to highlight how formal methods can be useful to better define
the security mechanisms and aims of security protocols and to offer a formal description
of SCEP1, the Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first attempt to give a formal description of this protocol, and we based our
study on the current Internet Draft [1]2.
The SCEP protocol gives specification for digital certificate enrollment, access and
revocation, and for certificates and CRL queries. SCEP is devoted to the distribution of
digital certificates to network devices, such as routers and gateways. It seems to offer a
valid support to the development of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), which are com-
munication networks realized on a public infrastructure, as the Internet. Using a VPN
involves encrypting data before sending it through the public network and decrypting it
at the receiving end, to achieve one or more of the following goals:
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1 SCEP is the evolution of specifications developed by Verisign Inc. and Cisco, and is already
commercially available in both client and CA Implementations
2 Released on September 11, 2001, it will expires on March 11, 2002. As declared by the same
authors, it has to be considered as a “work in progress”
– connect users securely their own corporate access (remote access);
– link branch offices to an enterprise network (intranet)
– extend existing infrastructure to include partners and customers (extranet).
Ideally, a VPN should behave similarly to a private network. Looking at the goals of
a VPN, authentication ensures the identity of all communicating parties and to correctly
identify an individual or a computer resource, VPNs typically use digital certificates.
Digital certificates were born in the field of public key cryptosystem: roughly, such a
system consists of an encryption function E, a decryption one D and a set of pairs of
keys (e.g., see [2]). Each pair consists of a public key  and a private one  . What is
encoded with one key, can only be decoded with the other one. In our context we assume
that  and  are different, but there are cryptographic systems where these must be
equal (symmetric cryptosystems). The adjective “public” means that everyone is able
to know the public key and so to use it. The adjective “private” means that only one
user knows the private key, that remains a closely guarded secret. These cryptographic
systems may be used to guarantee confidentiality and authentication of origin:
– Confidentiality: the sender of a message  can encrypt it with the receiver public
key ; the receiver will decrypt it with its own private key .
– Authentication of origin: the sender encrypts message  with its own private key

; the receiver tries to decrypt it with sender public key. Authentication of origin
should be guaranteed by the fact that only the sender knows the private key, and thus
only it generated the encryption. These concepts are the basis for digital signatures.
Basically, a digital certificate is an electronic document that declares the link between
an identity (i.e. a person or a machine), and a public key. It is issued by a Certification
Authority (CA), that can vouch for an individual identity. The way the CA vouches for
such link is to digitally sign the issued certificate by CA’s private key.
The main contributions of this paper are the followings:
– We formally analyze the SCEP protocol. We did not find attacks; at least in our
limited analysis scenario which consists in a bound number of participants. While
this cannot be enough to ensure the security of the protocol in every circumstances;
it enhance our reliability on such a protocol. (For other more powerful and complex
verification methods see []).
– We try also to point out that the application of automated verification tools for
security protocols is also useful to better understand how certain mechanisms and
checks ensure security features of such protocols. This may be useful to clarify
what happens when some security checks are omitted or erroneously implemented.
This may be also useful to clarify to non-expert people some statements done in
technical papers, where many times is asserted that a security check is necessary
but rarely the reason is given. We simply omit the check in a description of the
protocol, run the verification tool and wait for the result of the analysis. From our
experiences, we found out that it is particularly useful to formally study security
protocols by suitably changing the protocol description in order to simulate possible
faults and check the relative effect (like in common “Failure Model and Effect
Assessment (FMEA)” adopted in software engineering). Our next step will the one
of systematically create such case studies.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the usual scenario of
security protocols and give an idea of our analysis method. In Section 3, we describe
the structures of messages exchanged between parties during the phase of SCEP en-
rollment. Section 4 is dedicated to highlight the motivations for the presence in SCEP
specifications of some forms of correctness checks; without them, the protocol would
be vulnerable to attack by adversaries. Finally, Section 5 gives some conclusion.
2 Analysis approach
In standard communication protocols all the interactions are made by means of com-
munications, i.e. parties communicate with each other by exchanging a sequence of
messages on channels of the net. Talking about security communication protocols,
cryptographic functions are introduced in the structures of messages, in order to try
to guarantee the satisfaction of certain security properties pre-established by the proto-
col itself. Common security properties analyzed are secrecy (i.e. confidentiality of ex-
changed messages: nobody, except the legitimate participants, should know the content
of an exchanged secret message), message authenticity (i.e. no alteration of the content
of a message) and entity authentication (i.e. capability of identifying other parties dur-
ing a communication). Given the sensitive nature of information possibly exchanged in
a run of a protocol (e.g. credit card numbers, passwords, current account numbers) it
appears reasonable to consider the presence in the net of third malicious parties: such
intruders try to interfere with the normal execution of a protocol, in order to achieve
advantages for themselves. Due to the unpredictable behavior of such intruders, the de-
sign of distributed security protocols is very challenging. Several protocols that have
appeared in the scientific literature have been found flawed (e.g., see [3–5]) and this
also happens by assuming the underlying cryptographic primitives reliable, as in our
model. Indeed, we may have some subtle attacks due to how messages are exchanged
over the network.
For our analysis we consider honest participants  of a protocol plus an intruder
 , as a compound system  , i.e. a system whose components run in parallel and
can interact. Basically, our aim consists in verifying that a certain security property will
be satisfied by the compound system. We wonder if, for every possible active intruder
 ,  satisfies that property. A detailed description of our underlying theory can be
found in [8], while for other approaches one can see [6, 7]. To describe a protocol, we
developed an operational language, actually CCS process algebra by Robin Milner (
[10]), with slight variations for the treatment of cryptographic functions ([11]). We do
not need a priori any intruder specifications and moreover we make no assumption on
its behavior,  can be any term of the algebra. As the other protocol participants, it
has a set of message manipulating rules, that are used to model cryptographic func-
tions such as encryption and decryption. The intruder has the capability to send and
receive messages over net channels to and from the other components of the system,
it can also intercept and fake messages. It can build new messages by starting from its
initial knowledge, i.e. the set of messages we can freely assume the intruder knows at
the beginning of the computation, and other intercepted information obtained during
the run of the protocol. The intruder does not implement cryptanalysis: data encryption
is assumed to be “opaque”, i.e. a message encrypted by the public key of i cannot be
decrypted by anyone but the person who knows the correspondent private key, unless
the decryption key is compromised. An adversary can intercept and store an encrypted
message, and replay it later, but the structure of the message is not accessible to it, i.e.,
it cannot split the encrypted message, unless it knows the decryption key. The intruder
knowledge grows as the computation goes on: we consider if that knowledge satisfies,
at a certain point of the computation, a predicate based on the specific property. In the
case of a positive answer, our analysis reports an attack against the security property. In
other words, an attack is possible when  is able to force the execution of protocol to
be performed in a different way, by cheating the honest parties. The development of the
theory has lead to the implementation of a software tool for the analysis of distributed
systems with finite behavior, PAMOCHSA, the Partial Model Checking Security Ana-
lyzer, [9, 12].
In the following we give the standard notation in which security protocols are usu-
ally specified in literature - we refer to [11] for detailed information about our oper-
ational language to describe the protocols, in this paper we prefer to follow a more
intuitive notation. We then consider, with a simple example, the uncertainty about pro-
tocol specifications correctness. We are going to show how the security properties of a
protocol may be broken without implementing cryptoanalysis.
2.1 Notation
We consider a set of agents able to send and receive messages. Basically, we represent
the sending and reception of a message in this way:
     	
where 	 is the exchanged message,  is the i-th communication channel, on which
the exchange takes place.  and  are the sender and the receiver of	.
As already emphasized, since the net is public, we have to consider the presence of
a malicious agents , that can intercept and fake messages:
     	
     	
Notation (1) describes intruder  that sends a message 	 to party  pretend-
ing to be party  (forgery); (2) denotes: 	, originally intended for , is actually
intercepted by (interception).
The following notation for the exchanged messages will be used throughout the
paper:
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2.2 A simple example
Consider the following example, where a user  is willing to send to its 
 an order
to move money on the account of another user . Then,may send the message move
1000$ on’s account signed with its private key 

, i.e.:
  
  move 1000$ on X’s account



In communication networks, it is not possible to determine the origin of messages. This
must be deduced by the content of the message itself. Since this message is signed with
the private key of , the 
 should be sure that the message has been originated by
 and the order is legitimate. Thus, the 
 makes the money transfer.
Suppose that eaves-drops this message. It can send it again to the 
, i.e.:
  
  move 1000$ on X’s account



The
 has not the possibility to recognize the sender of the message, and the signa-
ture of this message is still valid. Eventually, gets 2000$. Thus, even without breaking
cryptography, the protocol can be attacked.
3 The SCEP Enrollment Phase
We formally describe the Simple Certificate Enrollment Procedure (SCEP), a two-way
communication protocol whose goal is the secure issuance of certificates to network
devices, such as routers and gateways, using existing technology. Actually, the latest
document describing SCEP is an Internet Draft, available on the Internet at [1]. The
protocol is one of the first such specifications to be adopted by numerous vendors be-
cause it offers a common method of enrolling (i.e. requesting and receiving digital cer-
tificates) from different Certification Authorities.
SCEP supports the following operations:
– CA public key distributions;
– Certificate Enrollment;
– Certificate Revocation;
– Certificate and CRL query.
In the following, we mainly focus our attention on the phase of enrollment.
An enrollment procedure consists of two main phases:
– the SCEP client, identified by a subject name consisting of the Fully Qualified
Domain Name (i.e. alice.iat.cnr.it) plus an IP address, asks for a digital certificate.
It composes its certificate request and sends it to a Certification Authority Server
(CA), an entity devoted to issue certificates, and whose name will be declared in
the certificate issuer name field.
– Certification Authority tests somehow the correctness of the received request; in
case of positive outcome, CA issues the certificate, digitally signs it and sends it
to the applicant. The secrecy and integrity of the private key of the Certification
Authority must be preserved, and this is why the CA Server should be an off-line
machine.
We will refer to SCEP client as User U. An User U generates its pair of asymmetric
keys with a specific key usage (i.e. only for encryption, only for digital signature, or
both). The public key to be certified and the key usage are conveyed to the CA through
the certificate enrollment request.
3.1 User Certificate Request
After the generation of the keys and obtaining the CA certificate, necessary to retrieve
CA’s Public Key in order to enroll, User generates its request using PKCS#10 and sends
it to the CA exploiting PKCS#7. PKCS#10 and PKCS#7 were issued by RSA Labs,
then made public and modifiable, as with PKCS#i (Public-Key Cryptography Standards
- http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/). They are standards “de facto”, PKCS#10
describing the syntax for certification requests, PKCS#7 defining formats to represent
data with the addition of cryptographic information, i.e. encrypted data or digital signa-
tures. PKCS#7 provides different kinds of formats, like Signed Data (data plus digital
signatures), Enveloped Data (encrypted data plus encrypted key by means of RSA), De-
generated Mode (for the distribution of certificates). Basically, a PKCS#10 request can
be formalized as follows:
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where 

	
is the Subject Name of the User U (Fully Qualified Domain Name plus
IP Address), 
	
is the public key to be certified, 

	
is a secret that associates the
subject name to that certificate request3.
PKCS#10 is completed by adding the digital signature of the 3-tuple Subject Name,
Public Key and Pin, using the User Private Key. This signature acts as a Proof of Pos-
session (POP), i.e. once CA has verified the signature, it has proof that who originated
the signature holds the corresponding private key. The key usage is specified in the
PKCS#10; if not explicitly declared, the usage is intended for both encryption and sig-
nature.
Once composed PKCS#10, User builds the Enveloped Data 4, exploiting PKCS#7
technologies:
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where  is a randomly generated symmetric key. The construction of Enveloped
Data provides the encryption of  with the public key of the CA, 


, so that
only CA can retrieve and successively obtain the PKCS#10 as a clear-text.
To complete the enrollment request, % creates Signed Data, basically consisting of:
	
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3 This pin is used for certificate revocation (currently implemented as a manual process: User
phones to a CA Operator asking for revocation of its certificate, the operator replies asking for
the challenge password, and if it coincides with the one contained in PKCS#10 request, the
certificate will be revoked). The pin can also be used to authenticate the identity of User U, as
explained in subsection 3.2.
4 For the sake of readability the structures of Enveloped Data, Signed Data and Get Cert Initial
message are here simplified (without however affecting the results of our analysis).
– The aim of the Transaction Identifier &$ is to uniquely identify a transaction. &$
is the MD5 fingerprint of the public key to be certified.
– 
 is a random number generated by the User, and its aim is to prove somehow
the freshness of a message.
&$,

	
are sent as “authenticated attributes” of PKCS#7, signed with private key
of % . Answers of CA to USER enrollment request can be of three kinds:
1. SUCCESS response: CA successfully emits the requested certificate;
2. PENDING response: CA is configured to act in manual mode. Before the emission,
it has to carry out some checks to verify enrollment request correctness;
3. FAILURE response: checks have done a negative result and CA does not emit the
certificate.
All these three answers contain the same &$ and 

	
present in User Certificate
Request.
When User receives a response from CA containing a pending “status”, it can enter
into polling mode, i.e. it can periodically send to CA Get Cert Initial messages, pressing
for the certificate emission. The structure of a Get Cert Initial message is substantially
the following:
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3.2 Modeling the enrollment procedure
For the sake of clarity, it is worth spending a few words about User Authentication.
In protocols that use public key cryptography, the association between the public keys
and the identities with which they are associated must be authenticated in such secure
manner. SCEP provides two authentication methods, a manual one and one based on a
pre-shared secret. In manual mode, once a certificate request has been sent to the CA, %
has to wait until its identity can be verified using any reliable out of band method. In [1]
it is suggested that CA generates the MD5 fingerprint of the PKCS#10 retrieved from
the User request, and to compare it with the one computed by the User itself. During
this period, the state of the whole transaction is set to “PENDING”.
Otherwise, the CA can choose to act in automatic mode: before any request takes
place, CA should distribute a pre-shared secret to the User - the secret is assumed to
be unique for each User (the way in which the distribution takes place is subject to the
CA policy). When creating an enrollment request, the User will insert the secret in the
PKCS#10 (later on, we refer to this secret as 

	
). Once receiving the request, the CA
should check the correspondence between 

	
and the subject name included in the
PKCS#10.
Enrollment procedure with out-of-band User Authentication. Formally, the enroll-
ment procedure with manual authentication of the User can be described as follows:
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Fig. 1. SCEP Enrollment Phase with out-of-band User Authentication.
1. U connects to CA and sends enveloped PKCS#10 and authenticated attributes. &$
	
is the MD5 fingerprint of 
	
.

	
is inserted in the authenticated attributes to
prevent replay attacks from the point of view of the User. In this procedure, every
answer from CA to User has to contain the same nonce of the previous message
from User to CA.
2. CA is configured to manually authenticate the end entity, so it sends back to User a
PKCS#7 message containing only authenticated attributes: “status” of transaction
set to pending, same transaction identifier and same nonce as in the User request.
3. Once received a pending status, % enters into polling mode by periodically sending
Get Cert Initial messages to CA, until either it receives the certificate, or its request
is rejected, or it simply times out. (Here, we suppose user successfully obtains its
certificate after the sending of the first Get Cert Initial.)
4. Communications on channels 4 and 5 should be intended out of band, i.e. not on
the network. (Our analysis tool allows to hide these two channels from the intruder,
in order to simulate a secure communication between CA and users). This reliable
out of band communication could be by phone or by surface mail. Anyway, CA
is intended to securely contact the User and communicate the fingerprint of the
PKCS#10 received in message 1. Hence, the User can compare the fingerprint with
the one computed from its original PKCS#10.
5. User gives a positive or negative answer to the CA, depending on the result of the
comparison.
6. Once received a positive answer from the User about the comparison of the fin-
gerprints, CA emits the certificate, The issued certificate is formalized here by the
name of the User and its public key signed by CA’s private key, 
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Enrollment procedure with Automatic User Authentication. Formally, when a pre-
shared secret scheme is used, the enrollment procedure is simply the following:
In this case, User Authentication is subject to the correspondence between 

	
and 

	
.
4 Analysis
A formal analysis of security protocols turns out to be an useful mechanism to bet-
ter understand motivations and choices for intrinsic structures of messages specified
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Fig. 2. SCEP Enrollment Phase with automatic User Authentication.
in Internet standards and drafts. In the following, we formally analyze both the SCEP
procedure with manual authentication of the User and the automatic procedure. In our
experiments, we consider a finite number of processes, each of them with a finite be-
havior. It must be borne in mind that, with regard to this scenario, SCEP guarantees the
correct emission of certificates.
Anyway, we will focus our attention on particular checks suggested in [1], in or-
der to understand some security mechanisms and the possible consequences of their
absence. In particular, we will consider the case of erroneous issuing of certificates, in
which there is a wrong correspondence between the identity and the public key to be
certified, and the event to issue two certificates with same subject, keys and key usage.
4.1 Relevance of User Authentication.
One of the security goals of SCEP is that no intruder can force the CA to emit erroneous
certificates, in which the public key / identity binding is subverted. Here, we perform
a simple analysis about the security of SCEP with out-of-band User Authentication
against an active enemy that may try to interfere with it. We make no assumption about
the behavior of this enemy. In principle, this is able to listen, intercept and fake com-
munications between legitimate users and CAs. We are going to check whether the CA
is able to emit certificates in which the name of a legitimate user is tied to a public key
provided by an enemy. This is an important question, seeing that if CA emits such a
certificate it is possible to cause the so called “responsibility attacks”. Indeed, someone
could sign something and make you responsible for that signature.
We check whether the enrollment procedure described in Figure 1 allows the emis-
sion of a certificate like 

	
 



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
. Taking into account the comparison of the
PKCS#10 fingerprints, our tool does not discover any attack. The computation stops af-
ter 10 sec (CPU time) and 18261 visited states. If the CA does not contact the User to
communicate the received fingerprint, or the User omits the comparison, the protocol
results vulnerable to a “man in the middle” attack. Our tool automatically discovers
an attack after 2,3 sec (CPU time) and 7521 visited states. The attack consists of the
following steps (see also Figure 3): .
1. U connects to CA as in a normal execution, but its request is intercepted by X.
2. X sends to CA a certificate request containing the name of User U.
3. CA’s answer contains a pending status.
4. U enters into polling mode. Its Get Cert Initial message is intercepted by X.
5. X simulates the polling mode.
6. Something went wrong with the comparison of fingerprint. It is possible to issue
the certificate related to the enemy request.
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Fig. 3. Attack: the intruder is able to force the emission of a certificate where its public key is tied
to the name of the User U.
Note 1. The particular structure of messages in SCEP protocol helps the User to dis-
cover it actually receives a faked certificate. Once received the CA answer containing
the certificate (message 6), U will not be able to open the envelope, since the symmetric
key  is encrypted with the wrong key, 

. Anyway, the enemy could intercept
message 6, so that the user does not receive the certificate. In these circumstances, the
user presumably sends to CA a sequence of GetCertInitial messages, pressing for the
certificate. The possible interceptions of Get Cert Initial messages by the intruder and
the consequent time out interrupt of U’s connection may lead U to realize that some-
thing wrong happened.
4.2 How to avoid the issuance of two identical certificates
User authentication in automatic enrollment, (Fig.2), is recommended by means of a
pre-shared secret scheme, where the pre-shared secret is represented in our formaliza-
tion by 

	
. As an enrollment request is received by the CA server, it appears rea-
sonable to verify the right correspondence between the applicant identity and its related
secret 

	
. Further, [1] encourages CAs to avoid the contemporary issuance of two
valid certificates with same subject name, public key and key usage. In SCEP specifi-
cation the User is allowed to re-use the same request when it times out from polling
for a pending request, or some errors in the network occur and the connection between
User and CA goes down. Anyway, the second request should not create a new trans-
action, nor should the second request be purely rejected. So, what should the request
re-emission lead to? There are some alternatives.
– If CA already emitted the certificate, and the re-emission of the request occurs less
than halfway through the validity time of an existing certificate, then CA should
realized that something was wrong in the first sending of the certificate. It can
possibly re-send the same certificate to the applicant, without issuing an other cer-
tificate.
– If CA already emitted the certificate, and the re-emission of the request occurs
more than halfway through the validity time of an existing certificate, this can be
interpreted by CA as a renewal request. In that case, CA should previously revoked
the existing certificate5.
– If CA does not emitted the certificate yet, the reception of the same request should
be taken by CA as another '#&
 messages, instead of a request for a
new enrollment.
There could be various reasons to prevent the re-transmission of the same data from
creating a second certificate. We cite some instances, by starting from the hypothesis
that CA emitted two certificates with same subject name % , same public key and key
usage. They will differ in the serial number, say 
 and 
, and the respective validity
periods possibly overlap. Suppose also that an enemy  was able to force the CA to
issue the latest certificate, so that is conscious of its existence, while % is unaware of
it.
– Considering a large scale application scenario, the computational cost in generating
and signing unused certificates can be high.
– Failing the adding of a timestamp, a document signed by % could be valid longer
than expected.
– U could maliciously extend his own certificate validity even when he is purposely
denied the right to a new certificate; for example in a corporate environment, an
employee might have access to a certain facility but only for a limited time.
Seeing that each public key to be certified is strictly connected to the Transaction Iden-
tifier &$, reasonable checks have to involve the record of the couple 

	
 &$
	
.
What could happen if a CA server does not care about that record is the incidental lack
of uniqueness: an intruder  could eavesdrop a legitimate certificate request and sim-
ply repeat it later. By this way, it can force the CA to issue two identical certificates
- apart from the serial number. The replay attack, as reported by our tool, is shown in
Fig. 4. We obtain this result after 1 sec (CPU time) and 2135 visited states. Basically, it
consists of the following steps:
1. U connects to CA as usual. Its request is eavesdropped by .
2. X connects to CA and repeats U certificate request.
3. CA emits a first valid certificate with serial number 


.
4. CA emits a second valid certificate with a different serial number, because it omits
checks on crucial fields in the received requests. is able to intercept the message.
Note 2. The user itself may unconsciously contribute towards the emission of identical
certificates. Suppose the client times out or the connection with CA Server goes down
for some reason. In those circumstances CA could emit a first certificate, but % would
not receive nothing because of the connection crash or the time out. Consequently,% is
allowed to re-issue the same request and the absence of checks by CA may lead to the
emission of a double certificate.
5 Before revoking the existing certificate, CA presumably should contact the User to have a
confirmation, but this is not declared in [1].
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Fig. 4. Replay Attack: the intruder is able to force the emission of a double certificate.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we gave a formalization of the SCEP protocol enrollment phase and per-
formed its analysis by means of the PAMOCHSAtool. With regard to a limited scenario
(finite number of processes with a finite behavior), we did not prove the possibility of
compromising the correct emission of certificates. Such a formal analysis contributes
towards considering SCEP specifications more reliable. Anyway, to understand more
deeply the introduction in SCEP specifications of certain security mechanisms, we
omitted in some of our experiments particular checks suggested in the Internet Draft.
As a consequence, we were able to automatically find attacks regarding the emission
of erroneous certificates in which the public key / identity binding is subverted, and
attacks against the uniqueness property, suggested in [1]. Seeing that our technique is
completely general and can be applied to several cryptographic protocols, it turns out to
be a valid support for the analysis of Internet standards, drafts and commercial products.
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